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Abstract 
 
This paper offers unique rankings of the extent to which fiscal structures of U.S. states 
contribute to economic growth. The rankings are novel in two key respects:  they are well 
grounded in established growth theory, in which the effect of taxes depends both on the level of 
taxes and on the composition of expenditures; and they are derived from actual estimates of the 
link between fiscal structures and economic growth.  Estimates for the latter yield a growth hill, 
in which the incremental effect of taxes spent on productive services and infrastructure initially 
rises, reaches a peak, and then declines.  Rankings derived from these estimates differ sharply 
from typical rankings based on levels of taxation alone.  Two hypothetical policy experiments 
highlight both the growth-hill effects of tax investments in productive services and infrastructure 
and the short- and long-term tradeoffs in attempting to fund strong social services.  
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Introduction 
 
 Taxes lie at the heart of American politics and public policy – beginning with the Stamp 
Act and Boston Tea Party, which helped to ignite the American Revolution, and the Whiskey 
Rebellion, which posed an early challenge to George Washington’s presidency, and continuing 
with more recent state tax limitation measures.  It is no surprise, then, that popular, policy, and 
academic interest in taxes – whether they are too high or too low and how they affect a region’s 
prosperity – is both intense and longstanding.  Would tax cuts, for example, stimulate state and 
local economies, as often argued, or, alternatively, would tax increases spent on education, 
training, public safety, and roads and bridges stimulate economic growth, as argued by others?  
This debate is voluminous; even listing the numerous studies of taxes is impossible here.  So, 
what can we hope to add? 
This paper offers a set of unique rankings of the extent to which fiscal structures of U.S. 
states (and their localities) contribute to long-term economic growth. In our analysis, we measure 
growth as the inflation-adjusted percentage growth in per-capita personal income.  The rankings 
are novel in two key respects:  they are grounded in established growth theory, where the effect 
of taxes depends both on the level of taxes and on the composition of expenditures; and they are 
derived from actual estimates of the link between fiscal structures and economic growth.  
Estimates for the latter yield a “growth hill,” in which the incremental effect of taxes spent on 
productive services and infrastructure initially rises, reaches a peak, and then declines. 
There are many rankings of state taxes and, in some instances, expenditures.  The U.S. 
Census Bureau reports state and local taxes annually, along with the rankings by state.  These 
reports are widely reported in the press at the national, state, and local levels, with keen interest 
in individual states in how their taxes compare to other states and whether they have moved up 
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or down in the rankings.  These and related data are also widely distributed, adapted, and 
augmented by various policy centers, including the Tax Policy Center, a joint venture of the 
Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution, the Tax Foundation, a conservative-oriented tax 
research group, and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a liberal-oriented budget policy 
research center.  All three are based in Washington, DC.   
However, these rankings beg the question of how state fiscal structures rank in terms of 
their contribution or hindrance to economic growth.  Addressing that question requires both that 
the measures used to construct the rankings be grounded in established theory of economic 
growth and that the rankings be calculated based on empirical estimates of the linkages between 
state fiscal structures and growth.  The former is critical because the impact of taxes on growth 
depends theoretically both on the level of taxes and on where the tax revenues are spent (e.g, as 
in Barro 1990 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  That is, the impact of additional tax revenue 
differs depending on whether taxes are initially low or high and on whether the revenues are 
spent on redistributive, consumption-oriented programs or on public services and infrastructure 
that contribute directly to economic growth.  The latter, i.e., that the actual rankings be calculated 
based on empirical estimates, is critical to ensuring that the rankings actually reflect the 
differential impacts of state fiscal structures on economic growth. 
No study, to our knowledge, has attempted to construct rankings of state fiscal structures 
that account for both these factors. A number of rankings have attempted to broaden the linkages 
to economic growth by incorporating other elements viewed as important to a state’s business 
climate (e.g., composition of public expenditures or regulatory environment), but even these 
account for neither the potential non-monotonic (i.e., growth hill) effect of taxes nor the actual 
empirical linkages to state economic growth.  Of course, there are numerous studies of the latter, 
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i.e., effects of taxes on growth, but these estimates are not used to compare individual state fiscal 
structures.  Many of these tax studies are summarized by Poot (2000).  Most studies report 
estimates for the effect of taxes on growth that are either insignificant or negative – though a 
small number are positive (e.g., Helms 1985, Mofidi and Stone 1990, and Bleaney et al. 2001).  
Similarly, estimates of the effects of government investment expenditures on economic growth 
also tend to be insignificant, though some studies find positive effects, particularly for 
expenditures on physical infrastructure and education (e.g., Cohen and Paul 2004 and Pereira 
2000).   
Barro-style models of economic growth, referenced earlier, suggest that all could be 
right, depending on the level of taxes, the composition of expenditures, and other factors.  In 
these models, for example, increases in taxes can enhance, have no effect on, or impede growth 
depending, in particular, on the initial level of taxes, as well as on how the tax revenues are 
spent.  For example, an incremental dollar of tax revenue spent on productive government 
services has a much more positive effect on growth when taxes are initially low than when they 
are already high, when the effect may even be negative.  This kind of “growth hill” arises from 
two interacting theoretical forces (as in Barro 1990 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  Rising 
taxes exert an increasingly negative effect on growth by depressing the net return to private 
capital, but expenditures on productive services and infrastructure exert a decreasingly positive 
effect.  Initially, when taxes are low, the additional taxes directed to productive services and 
infrastructure increase growth, as the positive effects of the latter outweigh the negative effects 
of the former.  Eventually, though, the negative effects of the rising taxes outweigh the positive 
effects of spending on productive services and infrastructure.  
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 In subsequent sections, we first present recent data for state fiscal structures, and then 
present empirical estimates, grounded in a Barro-style growth model, of the linkage between the 
fiscal structures and growth in real per capita incomes.  Next, we use these estimates to evaluate 
and rank individual state fiscal structures – i.e., taxes, expenditures, and other revenues – on the 
basis of the extent to which they contribute to or hinder growth in per capita income.  These 
newly developed rankings differ sharply from rankings based only on the level of taxes.   
With these rankings in hand, we then proceed to evaluate the effects of two hypothetical 
policy experiments on real growth in per capita personal income in each state:  1) a tax change 
with an accompanying change only in spending on productive services and infrastructure; and 2) 
a change in the relative budget shares for productive services and infrastructure versus social 
services,  with tax rates held constant.  We conclude with a summary and assessment of our 
results, as well as with a discussion of their implications. 
We should emphasize at the start that although economic growth is an important criterion 
in assessing fiscal structures, it is certainly not the only one.  We focus on growth here only 
because it is typically the most prominent concern in comparing state fiscal structures.  Other 
major criteria important in designing and evaluating fiscal structures include equity and fairness, 
stability and reliability, and ease of compliance and collection.   
State and local fiscal structures:  2004 
 To provide recent benchmark data for our study, we present in Table 1 total state and 
local taxes and fees, taxes and fees separately, other state and local revenue, expenditures on 
economically productive services and infrastructure (i.e., roads, education, public safety, and 
similar types of expenditures), and expenditures on social services – all expressed as a 
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percentage of total state personal income.1  There is a certain degree of arbitrariness in the 
division of government spending into economically productive and consumption-oriented 
spending.  For example, one might argue that health expenditures, particularly those on public 
health services such as immunization and mosquito abatement should be considered productive 
government spending.  But because of the level of aggregation in the Census Bureau’s tabulation 
of major functional categories of expenditures, it is not possible to parse the data at this fine level 
of detail.  Moreover, the reporting of some of the functional categories has varied over time, 
adding a further constraint.   
Data are for 2004 and include all 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia.  Median 
and average values, which do not differ greatly, are noted near the bottom of the table.  The 
median values are 10.13 for Taxes, 4.71 for Fees, and 4.61 for Other Revenues.2  The latter 
primarily represent inter-governmental transfers from the Federal government, which are not 
under the direct control of states and localities.3  Median values for the two broad expenditure 
categories are 14.64 for Productive Services and Infrastructure and 5.14 for Health, Welfare and 
Other Related expenditures.  We omit the budget surplus or deficit, which for U.S. states is 
typically quite small on average due to the prevalence of constitutional balanced-budget 
restrictions. 
                                                 
1 Economically productive services and infrastructure include expenditures on education, transportation, public 
safety, environment and housing, government administration, interest expenditures, and other expenditures not 
elsewhere classified.  Redistributive and consumption-oriented expenditures include spending on public welfare, 
hospitals, health, social insurance administration, and veterans’ services. 
2 The Census Bureau defines taxes as “compulsory contributions enacted by government for public purposes.”  In 
2002, sales, property, and income taxes comprised about 92 percent of state and local tax collections.  In this paper, 
fees refer to charges and miscellaneous revenue (other than taxes and federal government transfers).   In 2002, four 
categories of charges accounted for nearly 50 percent of fee revenue:  education (18.3 percent), hospitals (16.2 
percent), sewerage and solid waste (8.7 percent), and charges related to transportation activities such as highways, 
airports, sea ports and parking (6.2 percent).    
3 Many Federal transfer programs are matching grants, conditioned on state and/or local spending.  Thus, states and 
localities can influence Federal transfers indirectly through their own budget priorities.  
 5
 Table 1 also ranks states by total taxes and fees, expressed as a percentage of total state 
personal income.  This ranking is the one most prevalently reported and discussed each year, as 
the data are reported by the Census Bureau.  Even modest changes in the rankings are sometimes 
front page news in state capitals, especially for states that move from below to above the median, 
or vice versa.  But what information does this ranking actually give us about the extent to which 
the state fiscal structure enhances or inhibits economic growth?   
Note, for example, that Alaska, Wyoming, West Virginia, New York, and New Mexico 
have the five highest tax rankings, while New Hampshire (the “Live Free or Die” state), 
Tennessee, South Dakota, Maryland, and Connecticut have the five lowest tax rankings.  Are 
taxes in the five highest states too high for sustained economic prosperity relative to other states, 
or are taxes too low in the five lowest states?   Note, too, that North Dakota has a high tax 
ranking at 13, but South Dakota has a low tax ranking at 49.  Which is better, the 13 for North 
Dakota or the 49 for its neighboring state, South Dakota?   
We argue here that these questions are at best misleading, at least in the context of the 
rankings in Table 1.  They are misleading because the answers depend theoretically on both the 
level of taxes and where the tax revenues are spent, as well as empirically on comparisons based 
on empirical estimates of the actual linkages between fiscal structure and economic growth.   As 
we will find, rankings that account for both these factors are very different from the traditional 
rankings.  The potential importance of accounting for both factors is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which plots taxes and fees against expenditures on productive services and infrastructure.  Each 
expressed first as percentages of personal income and then converted to deviations from the 
median values.  The importance of both dimensions can be illustrated in several different ways.  
For example, states with very similar tax rates can have very different levels of spending on 
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productive services and infrastructure.  Consider, e.g., Florida, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Oregon 
and Montana -- all of which are near the median level for taxes and fees.  Even so, productive 
spending varies from substantially below to well above the median (e.g., from Florida to 
Montana).  
Alternatively, states with very similar productive spending rates can have very different 
levels of taxation.  Consider, e.g., Massachusetts, Colorado, Texas, Arizona, New Hampshire, 
Indiana, and West Virginia – all of which are slightly above the median for productive spending.  
Even so, taxes and fees range from substantially below to well above the median (e.g., from 
Colorado to West Virginia. 
Indeed, the strong clustering of states along a 45 degree diagonal observed in Figure 1, 
with the exception of a number of outliers, means that a growth-related ranking of states based 
solely on taxes (from high to low) is roughly an inverse growth-related ranking of states based on 
their expenditures on productive services and infrastructure. The question is how to assess the 
negative effects of taxes on growth on the one hand against the positive effects of productive 
spending on the other.  This is the central objective of our paper.    
Theory and evidence for comparing fiscal structures 
 Our theoretical context for estimating the linkages between fiscal structures and 
economic growth is drawn from growth models first developed by Barro (1990) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992).  In these models, the fiscal linkages to growth depend both on the level of 
taxes and on where the tax revenues are spent.  Taxes exert a nonlinear (i.e., increasingly) 
negative effect on growth, but expenditures on productive services and infrastructure exert a 
nonlinear (i.e., decreasingly) positive effect.  The interaction of these two forces, when tax 
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revenues are spent on productive services and infrastructure, yields a growth hill, where growth 
initially rises with taxes, reaches a peak, and then declines.4  
Empirical specification and data 
 Our approach here is an extension and elaboration of empirical specifications 
used by Bania et al (2007).  An empirical model of the inflation adjusted percentage growth in 
per-capita income must account for both revenue sources and expenditures as well as for higher-
order, nonlinear effects for taxes and expenditures.  Because the government budget constraint is 
a mathematical identity, it is necessary to omit one component from the empirical specification.  
In our case we include from Table 1 the variables Taxes, Fees, Other Revenues (Other), and 
Health, Welfare and Related expenditures (H&W), while omitting the category for expenditures 
on economically productive services and infrastructure (Prod).  Thus, an increase in Taxes, for 
example, is implicitly spent on Prod, with Fees, Other Revenues, and H&W held constant.  
Alternatively, the effect of an increase in Taxes spent on H&W is measured by the combined 
effect of equal increases in both Taxes and H&W, all else the same.5  We also include Other 
Revenues, which primarily consist of inter-governmental transfers from the Federal government, 
as an auxiliary fiscal variable, even though Other Revenues are not under the direct control of the 
state.  Our measure of economic growth, the dependent variable, is the (log) growth in real 
personal income per capita in each state.   
 In addition, we employ three state-level, time-varying controls:  the state unemployment 
rate, the annual budget surplus (or deficit) relative to state personal income, and unemployment 
                                                 
4 Differential economic growth across states may also induce long-term shifts in migration and state populations.  
Our use of real growth in per capita personal income tends to incorporate these potential effects in our measure of 
economic growth. 
5 If, instead, Prod were included and H&W omitted, an increase in Taxes would be implicitly spent on H&W, all 
else the same.  In this case, the effect of an increase in Taxes spent on Prod would be measured by the combined 
effect of equal increases in both Taxes and Prod.   
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insurance expenditures relative to state personal income.6  The unemployment rate is included to 
assist in controlling for short-term cyclical influences, since our intent is to estimate long-run 
effects.  Also, we find, as in Bleaney et al, that two-way fixed effects for both country (in our 
case, state) and period are important, so all final specifications include two-way fixed effects, 
which account for fixed differences across states and across years. 
Our data for state fiscal variables are taken from the Census of Governments at five year 
intervals from 1962 through 2002.7  Related data for corresponding years are obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state unemployment rate, and from the Department of 
Commerce for real personal income per capita. We exclude Alaska, since the variance in its state 
fiscal variables is extreme relative to the other 49 states, due in large part to the Alaska pipeline.  
We also exclude the District of Columbia, as well, since it not a state and idiosyncratic. Thus, we 
have data for 49 states at five-year intervals from 1962 to 2002, a total of 441 cross-section, 
time-series observations.  We focus on the longer sample period, based on five-year intervals, to 
better identify long-run effects. Summary statistics for the variables used in our statistical 
analysis are presented in Table 2.  The average value for Growth, our dependent variable, for the 
five-year data interval is approximately 13%, roughly 2.5% per annum. 
 We take the following approach in specifying the dynamics for the growth equation for 
personal income per capita.  First, we assume a priori that the current five-year growth rate is 
unaffected by contemporaneous fiscal variables, but is a function of the fiscal variables from the 
previous five-year period.  Thus, for example, real personal income growth per capita between 
                                                 
6 Consistent with other studies (e.g., Helms 1985 and Mofidi-Stone 1990), we treat UI expenditures as outside the 
regular fiscal structure, in part because UI is largely driven federally, with separate accounting.  A surplus (or 
deficit) variable is included only as an auxiliary control, since these are typically small for U.S. states due to 
constitutional limitations.   
7 The first of the U.S. Census of Governments surveys in our sample is actually for 1963, but our other data are 
aligned with 1962 to be consistent throughout with the subsequent five-year intervals for the Census of 
Governments.  
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1962 and 1967 may be influenced by the values of the fiscal variables in 1962, but is unaffected 
by the values of these variables in 1967.  Mofidi and Stone (1990) successfully employ this 
recursive approach for five-year data for states.  Eberts and Stone (1992) and Mark et al. (2000) 
employ a similar recursive strategy using longer lags with annual data – the former for major 
U.S. metropolitan areas, and the latter for jurisdictions in the District of Columbia metropolitan 
area.  Bleaney et al.(2001) find evidence of slightly longer adjustment for OECD countries, 
about eight years, but we found little gain in additional lags in our estimates. In addition, we 
employ a lagged dependent variable and instrumental-variable methods.8   
Estimates for fiscal policy effects 
Table 3 presents regression and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) instrumental 
variable estimates for our equation for Growth, the log-change in real personal income per capita 
(times 100).  For all estimates, the fiscal variable omitted from the estimated equation is Prod, 
the ratio of state and local expenditures on highways, education, and other related items to 
personal income (times 100).  As previously noted, we also include other auxiliary state variables 
in all columns of Table 3 to control for potentially confounding effects, especially short-term 
cyclical influences.  Again, these are the state unemployment rate, the ratio of the surplus (or 
deficit) to state personal income, and the ratio of unemployment compensation expenditures to 
state personal income.  The first is entered both contemporaneously and with a one-period lag; 
the latter two only with a one-period lag consistent with other fiscal variables.  The auxiliary 
variables enter significantly as a group at the five percent level, but have little effect on the 
                                                 
8 Dynamic fixed-effects models can generate biased and/or inefficient parameter estimates arising from the (explicit 
or implicit) presence of the lagged dependent variable.   In our case, the number of periods is well below the number 
of states included, so the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) style generalized method of 
moment (GMM) estimators are appropriate.  These GMM estimators use (first-differenced or orthogonalized) 
lagged values of the dependent variable and the exogenous (or predetermined) regressors as instruments. 
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coefficients for the other fiscal variables. Coefficients for the auxiliary controls are omitted in the 
tables for brevity.    
The first column of Table 3 begins with a linear, baseline specification with lagged 
Taxes, Fees, Other (Revenues), H &W, and two-way fixed effects for period and state, but 
without the inclusion of the nonlinear fiscal effects or lagged Growth.  The coefficients on 
Taxes(-1), Fees(-1), and H&W(-1) are each insignificantly different from zero at the five percent 
level. 9  The coefficient for Other Revenues (2.561) is significantly positive.  Overall, the fit of 
the equation (R-squared of 0.649) is relatively good for a growth equation with no lagged 
dependent variable.  Taken at face value, these estimates suggest that increases in taxes spent on 
productive government services have no effect on growth in per capita income.   
Returning to our main story, we now estimate a growth equation that is nonlinear in the 
fiscal variables, but not in the coefficients.  First, we estimate the equation incorporating squared 
and interaction terms for the state-level fiscal variables, i.e., Taxes(-1), Fees(-1), and H&W(-1).  
Next, we retain any higher order terms with coefficients in excess of the corresponding standard 
error.  The resulting equation includes only one higher order term, Taxes2(-1), the quadratic term 
for Taxes(-1).10  Of course, higher order terms other than Taxes2(-1) might still be potentially 
important.  If so, the variation in our sample data is insufficient to allow them to be estimated 
precisely.   
We present least-squares results including the nonlinear term for taxes, Taxes2(-1), in the 
second column of Table 3.  These also include fixed effects for both states and periods and the 
auxiliary control variables.  The coefficient on Tax(-1) is now significantly positive at 5.102, but 
                                                 
9 Estimations are performed in EViews 5.1.  The robust standard errors, in this case cross-section SUR, are 
described in EViews 5:  User’s Guide (2004, p. 887).  The notation (-1) indicates that the variable is lagged by one 
period – in our case five years.   
10 We apply this strategy based on our preferred GMM specification, column (3) of Table 3. 
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this linear effect is attenuated by a significantly negative coefficient (-0.216) for Taxes2(-1).  
Jointly, the linear and quadratic coefficients indicate a growth peak, consistent with a growth 
hill.  The coefficient on H&W(-1) is now significantly negative (-1.184), if only at the ten 
percent level. This effect indicates a significant difference in the effect of increasing spending on 
this category at the expense of productive government services. Of course, the objectives for 
expenditures for H&W are broader than simply economic growth, but the negative coefficient in 
column (2) highlights a potential tradeoff in terms of growth.  The coefficient on Fees(-1) is 
numerically close to zero and remains statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on Other 
Revenues remains significantly positive and relatively unchanged. 
In the third column of Table 3, we add the lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e., 
Growth(-1)) and present estimates based upon the GMM instrumental-variables estimator.11  
This estimator uses appropriately lagged values of the dependent variable (in our case to lag 3, or 
15 years) and other exogenous or predetermined regressors as instruments. This procedure 
accounts for the dynamics of lagged Growth, as well as for potential endogeneity bias.  While the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significantly negative, as expected, it is relatively 
small (-0.158).  Not surprisingly, then, the Taxes(-1) and Taxes2(-1) coefficients change only 
modestly and, again, remain significantly positive (6.008) and negative (-0.257), respectively – 
and consistent with a growth hill.12  The coefficient for Fees(-1) remains insignificant; the 
coefficient for H&W  (-0.844) is now significantly negative at the five percent level; and the 
coefficient for Other Revenues (1.889) is again significantly positive. Near the bottom of the 
                                                 
11 GMM estimates are obtained using E-Views 5.1, with fixed period effects, an orthogonal transformation for cross-
section effects, and robust cross-section SUR standard errors. 
12 The peak of the growth hill is at 11.69 for Taxes, calculated by setting the derivative of the estimated equation 
with respect to taxes equal to zero and solving for Taxes (i.e., 6.008 divided by 2 times 0.2576).   
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table, the J-statistic (25.55)) for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the 
restrictions at the five percent level.   
Rankings of state fiscal structures 
 We are now in a position to compare the extent to which individual state fiscal structures 
contribute to or hinder economic growth, as measured by real growth in personal income per 
capita.  Our primary ranking is a comprehensive one based on the fiscal variables directly under 
state and local control, i.e., Taxes, Fees, and H&W (and, implicitly, Prod).  A second 
incorporates Other Revenues, which reveals the extent to which relative economic growth for 
states is affected by inter-governmental transfers from the Federal government.   
Rankings of state fiscal structures 
The first set of comparisons in Table 4 presents our primary rankings for individual state 
fiscal structures.  The rankings are based on the estimated effect of each state’s fiscal structure 
on real growth in personal income per capita.  This effect is calculated by weighting Taxes, 
Taxes2, and H&W for 2004 in Table 1 by the corresponding coefficients in the estimated growth 
equation, column 3 in Table 3.  These comparisons reveal substantial variations in growth 
relative to the median state, which arise from variations in the level of taxes and the relative 
composition of expenditures on H&W versus Prod.13  More specifically, growth varies because, 
for any given composition of expenditures, tax revenues available from taxes could be either too 
high or too low in terms of growth; and also because, for any given level of taxes, the 
composition of government expenditures may be more or less conducive to growth, depending 
on the ratio of expenditures on productive services and infrastructure to health and welfare 
expenditures.    
                                                 
13 Taxes for the median state (10.13) fall just short of the peak of the growth hill for taxes (11.69). 
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Consider the first state at the top of the list in Table 4, Alabama.  Alabama’s fiscal 
structure lowers its growth rate by approximately 4 percentage points below that of the median 
state for a five year period, or nearly one percentage point in growth per annum.  This 
differential emerges both because taxes are relatively low, reducing revenues available for 
productive services and infrastructure, and because the ratio of the latter to health and welfare 
expenditures is also relatively low.14  At the other extreme, New Jersey’s fiscal structure raises 
its growth rate by 2.3 percent above that of the median state.  In this case, while taxes are 
modestly below the median, the ratio of health and welfare expenditures to expenditures on 
productive services and infrastructure is markedly lower – yielding a more positive effect on 
growth than for the median state.  Note that there is little difference in the impact of the fiscal 
structures of the median and average state, since the differential from the median for the latter is 
only 0.03 in Table 4. 
 To what extent do these rankings differ from those in Table 1, which are based solely on 
the level of taxes?  The Table 1 rankings go from high- to low-tax states.  Our rankings in Table 
4 go from fiscal structures with low-growth to high-growth impacts.  The correlation between the 
two sets of rankings should be perfect (1.00) if they contained exactly the same information 
regarding the growth impact of state fiscal structures.  However, the estimated correlation 
coefficient (0.184) is not significantly different from zero (p value of 0.206).  Surprisingly, the 
traditional rankings in Table 1, based solely on the linear value of Taxes appear to provide no 
information on the overall impact of individual state fiscal structures on economic growth.  Both 
the non-monotonic effects of taxes and where taxes are spent are important to economic growth 
                                                 
14 Note that unlike Taxes, Fees in Alabama are relatively high.  However, we find little net effect for fees on 
economic growth, at least as currently used in most states.  Theoretically and empirically, fees often play a role in 
both reducing access to public goods subject to congestion and in expanding the availability of the public goods. 
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– so much so, that rankings based solely on linear measures of taxes appear to provide no 
information about long-term growth. 
Rankings that incorporate Federal transfers 
 To what extent do Federal transfers to state and local governments (which account for 
most of Other Revenues) alter the effects of individual state fiscal structures on economic 
growth?  To examine this question we add the estimated impact of Other Revenues on growth to 
the first set of calculations.  That is, we add to the first calculation the effect of Other Revenues 
on growth by weighting Other Revenues for 2004 from Table 1 by the corresponding coefficient 
for Other Revenues from column 3 of Table 3.  Again, the comparison is for an individual state 
relative to the median state.  These rankings and calculations are presented in the second set of 
comparisons in Table 4.   
Clearly, Federal transfers play a major role.  At one extreme, for example, the rankings 
for Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, and Wyoming now shift from 3 to 43, 8 to 45, 4 to 32, 
and 7 to 49, respectively.  For these states, the poor ranking for effects of their fiscal structure on 
growth is substantially reversed by the role of Federal transfers.  At the other extreme, the 
rankings for Colorado, Florida, Nevada, and Virginia now shift from 26 to 3, 33 to 8, 48 to 5, 
and 35 to 1, respectively.  For these states, the strong ranking for effects of their fiscal structure 
on growth is also substantially reversed by including Federal transfers in the ranking. 
 If the differential effects of individual state fiscal structures on economic growth were 
precisely offset by Federal transfers, then one would expect: 1) no significant correlation 
between the two rankings; and 2) little variation in the growth effects in the second set of 
comparisons.  Indeed, the actual correlation (-0.204) is insignificant (p value of 0.160), 
suggesting that the growth variations arising from state fiscal structures do tend to be offset by 
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Federal transfers.  However, substantial variations remain in the growth differentials in the 
second set of comparisons, which means that Federal transfers, perhaps unsurprisingly, introduce 
other, independent differentials in relative growth rates.   
One might expect this pattern of results for at least two reasons.  One is that an objective 
of Federal transfers is to “even out” the burden of dealing with poverty and other related 
economic and social needs of populations in individual states.  This Federal role helps to ease 
what might otherwise be a vicious circle of high poverty and welfare needs, low investments in 
productive services and infrastructure, and low growth.  A second reason is that Federal 
expenditures in many areas are driven by national priorities:  important resources are 
concentrated in certain states, water and other transportation systems are not uniformly 
distributed across individual states, and defense spending is often linked to particular locales or 
regions. 
Rankings for Two Policy Experiments 
 So far, our rankings assess the overall impact of an individual state’s fiscal structure on 
economic growth, with and without incorporating the role of Federal transfers.  In this section, 
we address two policy-oriented questions involving hypothetical changes in taxes and the 
composition of expenditures:  1) What is the effect on economic growth of an increment in taxes 
dedicated solely to productive services and infrastructure?  And 2) what is the effect on 
economic growth of a shift in the relative budget shares for productive services and expenditures 
and for health, welfare and related programs, with taxes held constant?  Both questions provide 
information relevant to potential changes in state fiscal policies, at least with regard to the effects 
on economic growth. 
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Policy experiment 1:  a tax change devoted to productive services and infrastructure 
This question can be answered by calculating the mathematical derivative of our 
estimated growth equation (column 3 in Table 3) with respect to Taxes, with other factors held 
constant.  For each state this derivative equals 6.008 plus 2 times -0.257 multiplied by the value 
of Taxes for 2004 from Table 1.  Intuitively, the observed tax rate in each state is increased by 
one percentage point, with all of the incremental revenues devoted to productive services and 
infrastructure.  The difference in growth rates is calculated as the growth rate implied by the 
observed tax rate less the growth rate implied by the new higher tax rates.  Why is this question 
interesting?  Consider, again, the state of Alabama, which ranks number one in the first ranking 
in Table 4, i.e., it appears to have the fiscal structure least conducive to economic growth – both 
because taxes are low and because the ratio of expenditures on productive services and 
infrastructure to health and welfare expenditures is also relatively low.  What this means, though, 
is that an increment in taxes devoted exclusively to productive services and infrastructure would 
yield a relatively high payoff in terms of economic growth.   
At the other extreme, New Jersey, for example, which ranks 49 in the first ranking in 
Table 4, appears to have the fiscal structure most conducive to economic growth – because taxes 
are near those of the median state (which are near the peak of the growth hill for taxes) and the 
composition of expenditures is heavily tilted toward productive services and investments, with a 
relatively low budget share for health and welfare expenditures.  What this means, in contrast to 
the case for Alabama, is that an increment in taxes, even if devoted exclusively to productive 
services and infrastructure, might even reduce economic growth. 
Comparisons for an incremental change in taxes devoted exclusively to productive 
services and infrastructure are presented in Table 5.  As expected, states like Alabama, with low 
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taxes and a low share of expenditures on productive services and infrastructure, rank relatively 
well (at 49, in the case of Alabama).  A one-percentage point increase in taxes, devoted solely to 
productive services and infrastructure, all else the same, yields 1.69 percent addition growth over 
a five-year period, or roughly 0.34% per year.  Note, too, that absolute expenditures on H&W 
would also increase over time if the budget share for H&W remained constant due to the higher 
rate of growth.  By contrast, states like New Jersey, with taxes near the median (and peak of the 
growth hill), do not rank well (at 10 for New Jersey) for an increment in taxes spent 
productively.    
Of course, a state could instead start out with high taxes, well above those for the median 
state.  If the share of expenditures on productive investments is also relatively low, as for 
Wyoming, for example, then the state’s fiscal structure will not rank well in the first set of 
rankings for the overall fiscal structure (where Wyoming is 7) or in the hypothetical increase in 
taxes, even if the incremental revenues are devoted to productive investments. 
Policy experiment #2: a shift in budget shares for Prod versus H&W 
 Our second policy experiment holds tax rates and other factors constant, and instead 
increases the budget share for productive services and infrastructure by decreasing the relative 
budget share for health, welfare and related programs.  Because Prod is omitted from the 
estimation, the coefficient on H&W measures the effect of a change in H&W that is offset by an 
equal change (of opposite sign) in Prod.  Therefore, this effect is taken directly from the 
coefficient on H&W in the third (GMM) set of estimates in Table 3, with only a change in sign 
from negative to positive (from -0.844 to +0.844).  Since this effect is linear and other factors are 
held constant, it is the same for every state, and equal to (minus) the coefficient on H&W  
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(-0.844).  Therefore decreasing H&W by one percentage point and shifting these expenditures to 
Prod is estimated to increase the growth in real personal income per capita by just under one 
percentage point per five-year interval (or by about 0.17 percentage points per annum), all else 
the same.  Of course, a shift in budget share in the opposite direction, i.e., from Prod to H&W, is 
measured by simply changing the direction of the coefficient, i.e., from +0.844 to -0.844.  
Consequently, a one percentage point increase in H&W funded by an equivalent decrease in 
Prod is estimated to reduce the growth in real personal income per capita by just under one 
percentage point per five-year interval (or by about 0.17 percentage points per annum), all else 
the same.   
While the effect of a budget shift from H&W to Prod may appear small, the resulting 
higher growth in per-capita income may result in higher absolute H&W expenditures in the 
future.  If after the initial reduction in the H&W share the relative budget shares of Prod and 
H&W remain constant, then the higher growth in per-capita income that results from this budget 
shift will eventually restore the H&W expenditures to its original level.  In fact, all else the same, 
this restoration of H&W expenditures will occur after only 6 years of the higher steady-state 
growth rate.  After a full 25-year generation, real personal income per capita would be roughly 
five percentage points higher as a result of the one percentage point shift in budget shares, and 
absolute expenditures on H&W would be higher in percentage terms by roughly four times the 
reduced budget share for H&W from the experiment.  
Thus, this second policy experiment highlights, in particular, very difficult short- and 
long-term tradeoffs inherent in trying to improve funding for social services. A shift in budget 
shares toward productive services and infrastructure will temporarily decrease the absolute level 
of expenditures for H&W, but the higher growth will, over time, eventually raise the absolute 
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level of expenditures if the budget share remains constant.  Conversely, a shift in budget shares 
toward H&W temporarily increases the absolute level of expenditures for H&W, but the lower 
growth will, over time, eventually lower the absolute level of expenditures if the budget share 
remains constant.  
A further complication in evaluating either of the two policy experiments is the 
assumption that other factors, including Federal transfers, are constant.  In practice, some tax and 
budgetary shifts may or may not induce, either directly or indirectly, corresponding shifts in 
Federal transfers.  For example, a state decision to spend more on highways or public safety may 
or may not induce corresponding Federal transfers to subsidize these investments.  Or, a decision 
to spend more on state or local social services may or may not induce adjustments in Federal 
support for these programs in the state.  These detailed considerations are important in practice, 
but beyond the scope of the current paper.   
Concluding remarks 
This paper offers unique rankings of the extent to which fiscal structures of U.S. states 
contribute to economic growth.  Fiscal structures are designed, of course, with many complex 
and often competing goals in mind.  We focus here only on economic growth, as measured by 
growth in personal income per capita, since the traditional and most publicized tax rankings tend 
to focus on issues of state competitiveness and economic growth.  The rankings are novel in two 
key respects:  they are well grounded in established growth theory, where the effect of taxes 
depends both on the level of taxes and on the composition of expenditures; and they are derived 
from actual estimates of the link between fiscal structures and economic growth.  Estimates for 
the latter yield a growth hill, in which the incremental effect of taxes spent on productive 
services and infrastructure initially rises, reaches a peak, and then declines.  Rankings derived 
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from these estimates differ sharply from typical rankings based on levels of taxation alone.  
Indeed, our results suggest that the traditional rankings provide no comparative information 
whatsoever on the impact of individual state fiscal structures on economic growth, since the 
correlation between the traditional rankings and our rankings grounded in both theory and 
evidence is not statistically significant. 
In a second set of comparisons in which we incorporate the role of Federal transfers to 
state and local governments, we find that these transfers significantly attenuate the effects of 
individual state fiscal structures on economic growth.  At the same time, Federal transfers 
introduce substantial additional variations in growth.  We are not surprised at the former, since 
one objective of many Federal transfer programs is to mitigate the potential vicious circle of high 
taxes, low investments in productive services and infrastructure (and high expenditures on health 
and welfare), and low rates of economic growth.   
Our final set of comparisons considers the growth effects of two alternative policy 
experiments:  1) An increment in taxes dedicated solely to productive services and infrastructure; 
and 2) a shift in the relative budget shares for productive services and expenditures versus social 
services, with taxes held constant.  In the first experiment, states with fiscal structures not 
relatively conducive to growth, i.e., those states with relatively low investments in productive 
services and infrastructure and with low tax rates, will experience relatively large increases in 
economic growth.  Other states with fiscal structures not relatively conducive to growth, i.e., 
states with tax rates well above the median, will likely reduce growth with further increases in 
taxes, even if spent on productive investments.   
In the second experiment, our results tend to highlight the very difficult short- and long-
term tradeoffs in building strong social services.  For example, an increase in the budget share 
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for social services funded by a decrease in the budget share for productive services and 
infrastructure (or, alternatively by an increase in taxes) will typically temporarily increase the 
absolute level of expenditures on social services, but due to the accumulated effects of lower 
growth rate, expenditures on social services will eventually decline (all else the same).   
So, will a tax cut improve incentives and investment, stimulating increased growth?  Or, 
will a tax increase stimulate growth if the incremental revenues are spent on productive services 
and infrastructure?  Our evidence here suggests that the answer is:  “It depends.”  Traditional 
rankings based only on tax rates do not provide an answer.  Our rankings, numerical 
comparisons, and hypothetical policy experiments provide some of the information required to 
understand why “it depends” and some of the key factors on which the answer does in fact 
depend.  
Finally, several possible extensions of this paper merit further exploration.  First, many 
state policy makers may be interested in employment growth as well as the growth of per-capita 
income.  To what extent is this framework helpful in understanding the determinants of 
employment growth?  Second, our framework does not distinguish between different types of 
taxes (e.g. sales, income, and property).  How does the composition of taxes affect the results 
reported here?  Third, to what extent can one distinguish among more detailed categories of 
expenditures in identifying their effects on growth?  For example, are expenditures on education 
and highways equally productive in terms of long term growth?  Conversely, do all social 
services involve the same tradeoff against growth, or do some, e.g., public health programs, 
involve less of a tradeoff, if any?  We hope that findings in this study will serve to motivate 
investigations of these and other related questions.   
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Figure 1.  State and Local Taxes and Fees vs. Productive Expenditures, 2004
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Table 1  State and Local Government Fiscal Structures: 2004
                  (as a percentage of state personal income)
Ranking Taxes Productive Health,
by Taxes plus Other Services & Welfare &
State plus Fees Fees Taxes Fees Revenue Infrastructure Other Related
Alaska 1 27.32 10.62 16.69 10.82 30.62 7.22
Wyoming 2 21.23 12.95 8.28 11.43 12.68 6.96
West Virginia 3 18.15 10.63 7.53 7.36 13.84 6.06
New York 4 18.12 13.75 4.37 6.19 16.13 7.38
New Mexico 5 17.41 10.93 6.48 7.63 18.75 6.85
D.C. 6 17.40 13.98 3.42 9.55 11.53 8.94
Delaware 7 17.39 10.10 7.29 3.68 16.07 4.62
Maine 8 17.31 12.61 4.70 6.77 15.61 7.31
Louisiana 9 16.49 10.62 5.87 6.20 15.32 6.30
Utah 10 16.48 10.28 6.20 5.00 17.03 4.68
South Carolina 11 16.21 9.79 6.42 5.44 15.85 7.34
Vermont 12 16.21 11.58 4.63 6.93 15.71 5.71
North Dakota 13 16.17 10.13 6.04 7.00 16.69 4.44
Nebraska 14 16.16 11.16 5.00 4.49 12.82 4.73
Wisconsin 15 15.97 11.55 4.42 4.10 16.25 5.16
Mississippi 16 15.85 9.97 5.88 7.93 16.09 8.73
Idaho 17 15.69 10.15 5.54 5.00 14.38 5.14
Ohio 18 15.68 10.97 4.71 4.57 15.65 5.82
California 19 15.65 10.61 5.04 4.31 16.83 5.11
Michigan 20 15.55 10.33 5.22 4.66 16.30 5.26
Hawaii 21 15.51 11.69 3.82 4.45 17.21 4.96
Kansas 22 15.47 10.88 4.59 3.69 14.93 4.25
Iowa 23 15.37 9.83 5.53 4.69 14.48 5.68
Oregon 24 15.34 9.54 5.79 4.50 16.12 4.70
Montana 25 15.27 9.48 5.79 7.34 16.25 4.41
Florida 26 15.27 9.83 5.44 3.51 13.51 4.55
Rhode Island 27 15.26 11.38 3.88 5.75 14.39 6.12
Minnesota 28 15.22 10.53 4.69 3.88 14.67 5.96
Indiana 29 15.08 9.93 5.15 3.90 13.99 4.82
Alabama 30 14.93 8.41 6.53 5.44 15.52 7.33
Kentucky 31 14.82 10.15 4.68 5.53 14.96 6.04
Arkansas 32 14.75 9.82 4.92 6.03 14.54 5.76
Washington 33 14.72 9.85 4.87 3.56 15.71 5.17
North Carolina 34 14.72 9.99 4.73 4.76 13.45 5.80
Oklahoma 35 14.68 9.62 5.06 4.91 12.57 4.93
Pennsylvania 36 14.66 10.35 4.31 4.39 14.41 5.55
Nevada 37 14.40 10.11 4.28 2.44 14.64 3.09
New Jersey 38 14.29 10.94 3.35 2.75 13.85 3.03
Georgia 39 14.09 9.66 4.43 3.73 14.80 5.19
Texas 40 13.95 9.37 4.58 4.01 13.84 4.13
Colorado 41 13.79 8.77 5.02 3.13 13.91 3.38
Arizona 42 13.74 10.02 3.72 4.61 13.97 4.24
Illinois 43 13.73 10.24 3.49 3.55 14.91 3.84
Massachusetts 44 13.73 10.00 3.73 3.72 14.01 4.53
Missouri 45 13.65 9.26 4.39 4.57 12.15 4.98
Virginia 46 13.60 9.24 4.35 2.61 11.97 3.59
Connecticut 47 13.49 10.86 2.63 2.84 11.49 3.74
Maryland 48 13.39 10.13 3.26 3.29 10.93 3.33
South Dakota 49 12.98 8.66 4.33 5.84 12.83 3.84
Tennessee 50 12.59 8.50 4.09 5.41 11.35 6.56
New Hampshire 51 12.34 8.56 3.78 3.31 12.54 3.56
(median) 15.27 10.13 4.71 4.61 14.64 5.14
(average) 15.51 10.36 5.16 5.12 14.86 5.31
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2004.
-------------------- Revenues -------------------- ------------- Expenditures -------------
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Table 2  Means of Variables used in Statistical Analysis
                 (1962 - 2002)
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Growth log change in state real personal 12.69 5.55 -8.55 29.08
income per capita (x100)
Taxes ratio of state & local taxes 10.17 1.38 7.47 17.97
to personal income (x100)
Fees ratio of state and local fees 3.93 1.47 1.37 12.83
to personal income (x100)
Other Revenue ratio of other state and local 3.59 1.14 1.24 7.59
revenues to personal income (x100)
Prod ratio of state and local expenditures 13.87 2.28 9.1 26.35
on productive services and infra-
structure to personal income (x100)
H&W ratio of state and local expenditures 3.45 1.11 1.36 6.85
on health, welfare and related pro-
grams to personal income (x100)
Auxiliary control variables
Surplus ratio of total state and local surplus 0.36 0.99 -2.42 8.62
(deficit) to personal income (x100)
UI ratio of state and local expenditures 0.49 0.3 0.07 1.7
on unemployment insurance relative
to personal income (x100)
UR state unemployment rate (x100) 6.07 2.28 2 15.45
Note: See text for sources of data.
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Table 3  Estimated Fiscal Effects on Economic Growth 
           
Linear Nonlinear Nonlinear
Variable Model Model Model
(OLS-FE) (OLS-FE) (GMM-FE)
constant 14.232** -13.414 --
(6.242) (11.037)
Taxes(-1) 0.175 5.102** 6.008**
(0.427) (1.557) (1.081)
Taxes2(-1) -0.216** -0.257**
(0.065) (0.045)
Fees(-1) 0.180 0.368 0.012
(0.696) (0.662) (0.290)
Other(-1) 2.561** 2.380** 1.889**
(0.651) (0.605) (0.342)
H&W(-1) -1.184 -1.216* -0.844**
(0.665) (0.632) (0.345)
Growth(-1) -0.158**
(0.042)
State fixed effects yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes
R squared 0.649 0.663 0.658
J-statistic 25.547
# obs 392 392 343
** significant at the five percent level (* at ten percent level).
Notes:  Dependent variable is log change in personal income per capita.  Data 
are for 49 of the 50 states in the U.S. (Alaska is excluded) from 1962 to 1997  
in five-year intervals. See text for sources and further details. Robust (panel-
corrected, cross-section SUR) standard errors are in parentheses. The J-statistic 
is a test of the validity of the over-identifying restrictions in the GMM 
instrumental variables estimates in column (3).  
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Table 4  Effects of State Fiscal Structures on Real Growth in Personal Income Per Capita
  State Fiscal Structure
State  Ranking
Growth relative to 
median State  Ranking
Growth relative to 
median
Alabama 1 -4.00 Virginia 1 -3.39
Tennessee 2 -3.19 New Hampshire 2 -3.03
Mississippi 3 -3.17 Colorado 3 -2.86
New York 4 -2.36 Alabama 4 -2.43
South Carolina 5 -2.16 Nevada 5 -2.39
Maine 6 -1.42 Washington 6 -2.26
Wyoming 7 -1.32 Georgia 7 -2.14
New Mexico 8 -0.97 Florida 8 -1.85
Arkansas 9 -0.79 Minnesota 9 -1.79
Missouri 10 -0.75 Connecticut 10 -1.71
Kentucky 11 -0.74 Tennessee 11 -1.67
Iowa 12 -0.72 Delaware 12 -1.34
North Carolina 13 -0.67 Massachusetts 13 -1.27
Louisiana 14 -0.64 New Jersey 14 -1.26
South Dakota 15 -0.64 Indiana 15 -1.24
New Hampshire 16 -0.57 Texas 16 -1.03
Georgia 17 -0.48 Maryland 17 -0.96
West Virginia 18 -0.44 Missouri 18 -0.83
Minnesota 19 -0.41 Illinois 19 -0.83
Oklahoma 20 -0.30 Pennsylvania 20 -0.61
Washington 21 -0.27 South Carolina 21 -0.59
Rhode Island 22 -0.23 Iowa 22 -0.56
Pennsylvania 23 -0.18 Kansas 23 -0.52
Oregon 24 -0.18 North Carolina 24 -0.40
Ohio 25 -0.08 Oregon 25 -0.39
Colorado 26 -0.07 Wisconsin 26 -0.36
Montana 27 -0.01 California 27 -0.23
Idaho 28 0.01 Ohio 28 -0.15
Michigan 29 0.04 Michigan 29 0.14
Indiana 30 0.10 Oklahoma 30 0.28
Texas 31 0.10 Hawaii 31 0.48
Vermont 32 0.14 New York 32 0.64
Florida 33 0.24 Nebraska 33 0.67
California 34 0.35 Arizona 34 0.67
Virginia 35 0.39 Idaho 35 0.75
Massachusetts 36 0.41 Kentucky 36 0.99
Delaware 37 0.42 Utah 37 1.25
Utah 38 0.51 South Dakota 38 1.69
North Dakota 39 0.59 Arkansas 39 1.88
Wisconsin 40 0.60 Rhode Island 40 1.92
Arizona 41 0.67 Louisiana 41 2.35
Hawaii 42 0.78 Maine 42 2.67
Nebraska 43 0.90 Mississippi 43 3.11
Illinois 44 1.18 Vermont 44 4.53
Kansas 45 1.21 New Mexico 45 4.74
Maryland 46 1.53 West Virginia 46 4.75
Connecticut 47 1.63 North Dakota 47 5.10
Nevada 48 1.72 Montana 48 5.14
New Jersey 49 2.26 Wyoming 49 11.56
(average) 0.03 (average) 0.99
Note:  Growth rates are (log) change in real personal income per capita over
a five-year period.  See text for explanation and discussion.
  State Fiscal Structure plus 
Federal Transfers
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Table 5  Effect of Incremental Taxes spent on Productive Services and 
               Infrastructure on Growth in Real Personal Income Per Capita
Incremental
State  Ranking Growth
New York 1 -1.06
Wyoming 2 -0.65
Maine 3 -0.47
Hawaii 4 0.00
Vermont 5 0.06
Wisconsin 6 0.07
Rhode Island 7 0.16
Nebraska 8 0.27
Ohio 9 0.37
New Jersey 10 0.38
New Mexico 11 0.39
Kansas 12 0.42
Connecticut 13 0.43
West Virginia 14 0.55
Louisiana 15 0.55
California 16 0.56
Minnesota 17 0.59
Pennsylvania 18 0.69
Michigan 19 0.70
Utah 20 0.72
Illinois 21 0.75
Idaho 22 0.79
Kentucky 23 0.79
Maryland 24 0.80
North Dakota 25 0.80
Nevada 26 0.81
Delaware 27 0.82
Arizona 28 0.86
Massachusetts 29 0.87
North Carolina 30 0.87
Mississippi 31 0.88
Indiana 32 0.90
Washington 33 0.94
Iowa 34 0.95
Florida 35 0.95
Arkansas 36 0.96
South Carolina 37 0.97
Georgia 38 1.04
Oklahoma 39 1.06
Oregon 40 1.10
Montana 41 1.13
Texas 42 1.19
Missouri 43 1.25
Virginia 44 1.26
Colorado 45 1.50
South Dakota 46 1.56
New Hampshire 47 1.61
Tennessee 48 1.64
Alabama 49 1.69
(average) 0.72
Policy Experiment #1:  Incremental Taxes for  
Productive Services/Infrastructure
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